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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ZACHERY SCOTT SHIPMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43632
Kootenai County Case No.
CR-2014-1461

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Shipman failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
relinquishing jurisdiction?

Shipman Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Shipman pled guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under 16 and, on October 1,
2014, the district court imposed a unified sentence of 20 years, with 10 years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.86-89.) In May 2015, Shipman returned from the rider
program with a recommendation for relinquishment; however, the district court
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continued to retain jurisdiction and entered an order requesting that Shipman be
returned to the rider program.

(R., pp.104-05; PSI, p.61. 1)

In September 2015,

following a jurisdictional review hearing, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and
reduced Shipman’s sentence to a unified sentence of 20 years, with five years fixed.
(R., pp.109-10.) Shipman filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s order
relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp.111-14.) He also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a
reduction of sentence, which the district court granted, reducing the Shipman’s
sentence to a unified sentence of 20 years, with four years fixed. (R., pp.120-21; Order
Granting

Defendant’s

Motion

for

Reconsideration

Pursuant

to

I.C.R.

35

(Augmentation).)
Shipman asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction because he disputes rider staff’s characterization of his behavior toward
other offenders as “grooming behavior,” because he believes that the district court relied
only on his static risk factors in determining that there was no change to his risk level,
and because his “poor journaling” while in the rider program “did not warrant
relinquishment.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-10.) Shipman has failed to establish an abuse
of discretion.
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 19-2601(4).
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. See
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “CR141461 SHIPMAN #43632 PSI.pdf.”
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State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203,
205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).

A court’s decision to relinquish

jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583,
584 (Ct. App. 1984).
Shipman first contends that it was improper for the district court to relinquish
jurisdiction based in part on what the rider staff characterized as “grooming behavior.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.) While the district court stated it did not “take any offense” to
the use of the word “grooming” (9/24/15 Tr., p.52, Ls.6-7), it clearly did not base its
decision on a belief that Shipman was, as he defines the word, “preparing … children
for sexual abuse” (Appellant’s brief, p.6) during his rider. Rather, the court indicated
that it did not take issue with the word “grooming” because it was “used in the [APSI],
it’s a word attributed to [Shipman] in the report.” (9/24/15 Tr., p.52, Ls.6-9.)
Furthermore, regardless of whether or not rider staff was correctly using the word
“grooming” to describe Shipman’s inappropriate behavior, the fact remains that
Shipman’s behavior clearly violated program rules and did, in fact, indicate “poor
boundaries and instant gratification,” which reduced the likelihood that he could be
safely supervised in the community. (PSI, p.89.) Shipman first violated NICI’s “touching
policy” by “getting close behind another offender and resting his chin on the other
offender’s shoulder.”

(PSI, pp.75-76.)

He received a warning about this behavior;

however, he continued to engage in inappropriate conduct toward other offenders.
Rider staff reported a “minimum of four occasions” during which Shipman “approached
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these young men with sexual innuendo and desire” and noted that the other offenders
were all “younger looking and somewhat passive males.” (R., pp.64, 75-76.) Four
months into his rider, an offender reported: “‘[Shipman] told me I was his type of guy ….
He mentioned if we get out maybe having sex with me, and I said you have a [girlfriend],
and he said she didn’t have to know.’” (PSI, p.73.) Shipman later admitted to rider staff
that “if [he and the other offender] did get together in the community, he would likely
pursue a sexual relationship with [the other offender].” (PSI, p.73.) Shipman received a
DOR as a result of this incident, as staff advised, “This behavior is considered sexual
harassment within this prison setting.”

(PSI, pp.63, 67.)

NICI subsequently

recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction, stating that Shipman’s
behavior “indicat[ed] his lack of control and/or ability to modify his behavior in the most
controlled environment available. He does not appear to be amenable to probationary
supervision at this time.” (PSI, pp.61, 70.)
At the jurisdictional review hearing held on May 21, 2015, the district court
continued to retain jurisdiction, but warned:
Well, if I had to make my decision today it would be to follow the
report recommendation; that’s that I relinquish jurisdiction. I have nothing
to lose by sending you back on your rider. The department doesn’t have
to take you back. If they don’t, then I’ll relinquish jurisdiction. There are
parts of this report that say you’re amenable to treatment, but what I think
the report is saying is that you’re not an acceptable risk to be put in the
public and treated in the public, and I completely agree with that
assessment, and even – I don’t want you the get your hopes up, because
even if you come back with a recommendation for probation, I can’t make
this go away. I will not put it out of my mind. I will not put the facts of your
underlying crime out of my mind, but there is no way I will place you on
probation five months from now or however many more months you have
left if there is any more conduct.
You know, I don’t give a darn about your sexuality, but what I will
not tolerate is you not being able to control your impulses, and this report
4

is chock-full with that, so if there is any indication that you can’t control
your impulses sexually, you’re going to go to prison, I won’t modify your
sentence … so either figure out a way to get control of your impulses or
get used to being in an institutional setting because I won’t accept an
unreasonable risk to have you out in the community, and that’s all I see
here right now.
(5/21/15 Tr., p.31, L.24 – p.33, L.4 (emphasis added).)
Less than three weeks after he was returned to the rider program at NICI,
Shipman resumed his inappropriate behavior and incurred a disciplinary sanction. (PSI,
p.79.) The report of the incident stated:
Mr. Shipman was seen by staff walking the ball field with an
offender he had previously engaged in grooming behavior with. Mr.
Shipman was given a direct order to stay away from that offender. When
confronted in group about his behavior, he attempted to minimize his
behavior. However, he eventually admitted that he in fact is attracted to
the other offender and was engaging in grooming behavior. As he was
told during his previous “Rider,” if he continues with such behavior, he will
not be safe in the community, as it indicates poor boundaries and instant
gratification.
(PSI, p.79.) In the subsequent APSI, program staff reported that Shipman “did the bare
minimum in his assigned work of the required program material,” including providing
“the bare minimum of detail” in his Fearless Criminal Inventory and doing a “poor job of
journaling daily, completing approximately 30% of the entries.” (PSI, pp.80, 82.) At the
second jurisdictional review hearing, the district court noted that Shipman had again
engaged in conduct that he admitted was grooming behavior, and stated:
So that event, the fact that you did a poor job of journaling daily,
and you completed only about thirty percent of your entries gives me no
confidence that you would be able to turn it around in the community, and
… this is a protection of the public matter. What you did with your victim in
this case is absolutely horrific.
…
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So you can phrase it however you want to, and that’s great, I’m
glad that you’ve learned something in the programming that you’ve been
through in almost your last 365 days, but I am not convinced that we’re
anywhere close to the point where I could in good conscience –
consciousness release you out into the community for further sex offender
treatment.
(9/24/15 Tr., p.52, L.23 – p.54, L.1.)
The district court clearly did not base its decision to relinquish jurisdiction on a
mistaken belief that Shipman was preparing children for sexual abuse during his rider.
Instead, it considered Shipman’s lack of impulse control and ongoing violations of the
Sex Offender Assessment Group rules -- even after the court specifically warned him to
cease such behavior if he did not wish to remain incarcerated, the fact that Shipman put
minimal effort into his programming, and the fact that Shipman’s assessed risk level had
not been reduced. While it is true that the district court stated, “The STATIC-99 has
gone nowhere; still at a moderate to high risk to reoffend” (9/24/15 Tr., p.52, Ls.5-6), the
court subsequently clarified that it understood that the static factors would not change,
but that Shipman’s overall risk level had not been reduced (9/24/15 Tr., p.55, Ls.7-20;
compare PSI, p.43 with PSI, p.85).

Specifically, in response to defense counsel

pointing out that Shipman’s static risk factors would not change over time, the district
court stated:
I understand that, but we’re still at an assessed moderate to high
level with conduct occurring in a controlled setting, the grooming behavior,
and going back after our meeting in May of this year and still continuing in
that behavior there – I understand your point, but that moderate to high
level is too much of a risk, and I think the moderate to high level of risk is
corroborated by his engaging in further conduct in a sexual nature in a
prison setting, and … I don’t see that fact changing that there won’t be a
high likelihood of future victims, and I think it corroborates the moderate to
high level that we’ve seen in this case if that makes sense.
(9/24/15 Tr., p.55, Ls.7-20.)
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The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably
concluded that Shipman was not an appropriate candidate for probation, particularly in
light of the egregiousness of the offense, Shipman’s poor conduct and minimal effort in
the rider program, and the risk he presents to the community. Given any reasonable
view of the facts, Shipman has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
relinquishing jurisdiction.

DATED this 12th day of April, 2016.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of April, 2016, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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